Reliability data update using condition monitoring and prognostics in probabilistic safety assessment  by Kim, Hyeonmin et al.
ww.sciencedirect.com
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 4e2 1 1Available online at wScienceDirect
journal homepage: ht tp: / /www.journals .e lsevier .com/nuclear-
engineer ing-and-technology/Original Article
RELIABILITY DATA UPDATE USING CONDITION MONITORING
AND PROGNOSTICS IN PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTHYEONMIN KIM, SANG-HWAN LEE, JUN-SEOK PARK, HYUNGDAE KIM,
YOON-SUK CHANG, and GYUNYOUNG HEO*
Kyung Hee University, 1732 Deogyeong-daero, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 446-701,
Republic of Koreaa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 12 October 2014
Received in revised form
9 December 2014
Accepted 10 December 2014
Available online 21 January 2015
Keywords:
Condition monitoring
Probabilistic safety assessment
Prognostics* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: gheo@khu.ac.kr (G. Heo).
This is an Open Access article distribute
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0) wh
medium, provided the original work is prop
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.net.2014.12.008
1738-5733/Copyright © 2015, Published by El
Special Issue on ISOFIC/ISSNP2014.a b s t r a c t
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has had a significant role in quantitative decision-
making by finding design and operational vulnerabilities and evaluating cost-benefit in
improving such weak points. In particular, it has been widely used as the core methodology
for risk-informed applications (RIAs). Even though the nature of PSA seeks realistic results,
there are still “conservative” aspects. One of the sources for the conservatism is the as-
sumptions of safety analysis and the estimation of failure frequency. Surveillance, diag-
nosis, and prognosis (SDP), utilizing massive databases and information technology, is
worth highlighting in terms of its capability for alleviating the conservatism in conven-
tional PSA. This article provides enabling techniques to solidify a method to provide time-
and condition-dependent risks by integrating a conventional PSA model with condition
monitoring and prognostics techniques. We will discuss how to integrate the results with
frequency of initiating events (IEs) and probability of basic events (BEs). Two illustrative
examples will be introduced: (1) how the failure probability of a passive system can be
evaluated under different plant conditions and (2) how the IE frequency for a steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) can be updated in terms of operating time. We expect that
the proposed model can take a role of annunciator to show the variation of core damage
frequency (CDF) depending on operational conditions.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has evolved as a deci-
sion-making tool for enhancing the design and operational
vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants (NPPs) since the 1970s.d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricte
erly cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaRisk-informed applications (RIAs) supported by PSA are
particularly useful for allocating limited resources while
maintaining safety. The nature of PSA seeks realistic calcu-
lations so the PSAmodel enables engineers to find the relative
priority of accident scenarios, weak points in achievingCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
d non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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those vulnerabilities. However, there are still “conservative”
aspects in the procedures for developing a PSA model. One of
the sources for the conservatism is the assumptions of safety
analysis and the estimation of failure frequency. However, the
scope of RIAs are getting wider by virtue of state-of-the-art
enabling techniques in recent years [1].
Surveillance, diagnosis, and prognosis (SDP) utilizing
massive databases and information technology is one such
enabling technique. It is worth highlighting SDP in terms of its
capability of alleviating the conservatism in conventional PSA.
SDP is common in massive manufacturing lines and safety
critical industries, whereas its pros and cons have not been
explicitly verified in the nuclear field due to the principle of
“proven technology”. Because there are many methods for
SDP, it is difficult to explain the pros and cons for all individual
SDP methods. Therefore, the common characteristics of SDP
methods are explained in this article. The SDPmethods can be
roughly categorized as physical methods and empirical
methods.
If the underlying physical mechanisms of a system arewell
understood, then an analytical model based on first principles
can be developed to describe the expected behavior depending
on operating conditions. However, these methods can be
costly and time-consuming to develop for large, complex
systems, and the developed models often have limited appli-
cability. Additionally, simplifying assumptions are often
necessary for phenomena that are not fully understood or to
improve runtime performance. Meanwhile, empirical models
are built on the historical operation data without an explicitly
defined understanding of the underlying physical mecha-
nisms of the system. However, it is difficult to collect enough
data to develop amodel and update it when a new observation
occurs [2,3].
Nevertheless, it does not seem that the nuclear industry
can avoid the approaching technical tide. Recently, a study
dealingwith the applicable areas and state-of-the-art status of
SDP in the nuclear industry was published [2]. A detailed
technical description can also be found in the literature
[4e7]. Various approaches merged with SDP and other
enabling techniques such as living PSA [8], dynamic PSA [9],
and aging PSA [10] have been proposed to increase the value
of PSA.
Recently, the concept of “state-dependent PSA” was sug-
gested and a case study about the degradation of steam
generator tubes was analyzed using mechanistic aging
models and surveillance techniques [11]. Additionally, in
order to overcome the weakness of event tree and fault tree
analysis, which is to say their static nature, the calculation
of real-time risk using “Go-Flow” was suggested [12].
This article shares the same motivation with the previous
works and introduces a recent achievement regarding a
method of improving the applicability of PSA using condition
monitoring for the performance of passive safety systems and
condition prognostics for material degradation. The concept
of online PSA which is a common designation of time- and
condition-dependent PSA is discussed in more detail in the
next section. Then two enabling techniques and preliminary
results to support an on-line PSA model are reviewed. The
authors illustrate (1) how to develop a condition-dependentPSA that will be demonstrated by a passive residual heat
removal system (PRHRS) and (2) how to use prognostics to
update the initiating event (IE) frequency under material
degradation and how this contributes to a time-dependent
PSA which will be illustrated by an accident scenario, steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR).2. Background
This study originated from the question: Why can't PSA be
used as a real-time risk annunciator? The authors took note of
the availability of the SDP techniques. There are a lot of factors
for PSAmodelling and those factors seemed to be able to have
a real-time nature when they are integrated with the SDP
techniques. The main benefit of SDP is to reduce uncertainty
(which means fewer systematic and random errors) and to
forecast future risk because SDP can update statistical infor-
mation in a timely manner.
The conventional PSA generally results in static estimation
for core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release fre-
quency. Variations of the conventional PSAmodels attempted
to provide dynamic information but they belong to essentially
“offline” analysis. Aside from the practical availability of the
SDP techniques in the field, they can supply online informa-
tion, if successful, so it is expected that a PSA model will also
be able to have an online nature; for example, real-time CDF
depending on the occurrence of an external event or in terms
of operating time.
There are a lot of issues that should be considered to
achieve the online method. The authors are conducting two
themes: (1) condition monitoring for performance of passive
safety systems and (2) condition prognostics for material
aging or degradation. We named the former as condition-
dependent PSA and the latter as time-dependent PSA to clarify
the purpose of the SDP techniques. The result of the conven-
tional PSA was the probabilistic expression for risk from the
current viewpoint, whereas the result of the online PSA inte-
grated with the SDP techniques can perform the similar
function of early warning.
Fig. 1 shows a comparison between a reliability-based
distribution coming from the conventional PSA and a
condition-based distribution. The reliability-based
distribution can be obtained from traditional time-to-failure
analysis. The transition from a reliability-based distribution
to a condition-based distribution can be done by dynamic
Bayesian approaches with the observation of condition
indicators. The condition-based distribution characterizes
the lifetime of a specific system or components operating in
components operating in that system specific environment.
In Fig. 1, the monitoring of condition indicators updates the
condition-dependent model and the condition prognostics
support the time-dependent model [13].
For convenience, the authors focused on Level 1 PSA to
illustrate our ideas. Fig. 2 represents the general outcomes for
Level 1 PSA. The main outcome in Level 1 PSA is a CDF using
event-tree analysis and fault-tree analysis. The event tree
and fault tree were basically made to include each accident
scenario and correlation of systems. The frequency of an
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Fig. 1 e Comparison between reliability-based distribution
and condition-based distribution.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 4e2 1 1206end state of a specific accident scenario is calculated by the
combination of the event tree and the fault tree. For
instance, if the last end state in Fig. 2 corresponds to a core
damage state, then it is determined by Equation 1.
CDF ¼ IE F1 ¼ IE ðA BÞ; (1)
where IE is the frequency of an initiating event (IE), A and B are
the probabilities of basic events (BEs).
The values of frequency or failure probability are obtained
through statistical analysis fromdiverse information. The SDP
techniques can contribute to this statistical analysis by getting
frequency and failure probability. Conventionally, statistical
analysis in Level 1 PSA has used reliability-based distribu-
tions. If we replace reliability-based distributions with condi-
tion-based distributions using the SDP techniques, then weInitiating
event System 1
Detail of an
AccidentSystem 2
IE*S1*S2
IE*S1*F2IE
S1
F1
S2
F2
F1
A B
IE*F1
IE*F1
(Core damage)
End state
Fig. 2 e Outcomes of Level 1 probabilistic safety
assessment.can expect Fig. 3. Prior to an observation, the CDF and its
uncertainty band are kept constant in the conventional PSA
model. Meanwhile, the new CDF represents the latest
interval estimation in terms of reactor operating time. In
this case, the CDF and the uncertainty band are changeable
depending on the quality of the SDP techniques.
The frequency of IEs, equipment unavailability, probability
of human error, and probability of recovery failure all increase
due to aging effects. Thus, aging effects will affect the plant
risk, and the CDF for old plants must be larger than those for
new plants. As these errors change in real time, the CDF
should also be changed in real time. For example, the CDF
value between overhauls remains constant in a conventional
PSA. Fig. 3A shows an unchanged CDF along with operating
time. Furthermore, conventional PSA has a fixed uncertainty
band. However, an on-line PSA can provide variable CDF in
operating time as shown in Fig. 3B. The uncertainty band in
the online PSA can be reduced because the SDP algorithms
update the prior distribution for IEs and BEs.3. Methods and results
3.1. Condition monitoring
As an example of a condition-dependent PSA model, the au-
thors demonstrate the method to monitor thermohydraulic
conditions and estimate the failure probability of a PRHRS. A
PRHRS is expected to safely remove the core decay heat via
natural circulation in the case of station blackout (SBO). In
conventional PSAs, the PRHRS has “perfect” reliability as it
only relies on natural circulation phenomena. Nevertheless, a
PRHRSmay fail because themagnitude of such natural driving
forces depends on the specific plant conditions [14]. Since the
late 1990s, several studies have dealt with the reliability
analysis of natural circulation test loops or passive systems.
The results of previous studies showed the possibility of
functional failure of thermal-hydraulic passive safety
systems [15e19]. The authors attempted to assess the
thermal-hydraulic reliability of the PRHRS on the basis of
condition monitoring results, which can be ultimately
applied to update the failure probability of the PRHRS. Fig. 4
shows the results of this analysis contributing on the
probability of a corresponding BE.
Fig. 5 presents the basic configurations of a PRHRS for a
1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR). We considered a
simplified PRHRS that utilizes heat exchanger tubes in the
in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST)
connected through the cold leg and hot leg to the core. The
system is regarded as “Fail” when the maximum
temperature of the coolant at core exit goes over 216C for
36 hours. Thermal-hydraulic behaviors of the PRHRS in SBO
were analyzed using the best-estimated thermal-hydraulic
system code, MARS-KS [20].
The representative design and operation parameters rele-
vant to thermal-hydraulic analysis of the PRHRS aremass flow
rate, decay heat power, pressure of the loop, number of heat
exchanger tubes, and temperature and level of water in the
IRWST. The uncertainty of theses parameters originates from
C
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Fig. 3 e Comparison of core damage frequency (CDF) in conventional probabilistic safety assessment (PS) and online PSA.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 4e2 1 1 207the error of the measurement device. For example, the pri-
mary loop of the PRHRS is considered to have 8% error of
operating pressure [21]. The conditions for thermal-hydraulic
simulation of the PRHRS were 15.5 MPa for the reactor
pressure, 3827.25 kg/s for the reactor coolant mass flow rate,
0.0157 m for the heat exchanger tube outer diameter, and
8 m for the water level of the IRWST. In this work, the
reactor power and temperature in the IRWST are specifically
considered. Table 1 shows the nominal values, the expected
variation of each nominal value (range), and the results of
probability distribution using Monte Carlo for the individual
discretized value while assuming a Gaussian distribution
with 95% confidence level. The probabilities in Table 2 were
obtained by the product of a discretized probability of
reactor power and IRWST temperature. At this stage, we
have not considered intersection operation because of
complex calculation. Considering the overall influence of
two parameters, the averaged reliability of the PRHRS was
calculated to be 0.8. However, when either the reactor power
or IRWST temperature of the PRHRS is known via online
condition monitoring systems, it is found that reliability of
the PRHRS is different from the overall value of 0.8 and
dependent on the condition of the monitored parameter, as
shown in Fig. 6. That is, the online monitoring of thermal-Fig. 4 e Example of condition monitoring in online
probabilistic safety assessment.hydraulic conditions can enable one to calculate a more
accurate failure probability for the PHRHS.3.2. Condition prognostics
The estimation of the IE frequency can be time-dependently
performed on the basis of the prognostics results. The general
steps of using prognostics to update the IE frequency are
summarized as follows: (1) search the statistical parameters
for the prior IE frequency; (2) forecast the failure behavior (or
perform prognostics) of the IE frequency; (3) obtain the sta-
tistical parameters for prognostics data; and (4) integrate the
prior IE frequency and prognostics data using Bayesian
update.
In order to obtain the statistical parameters in prognostics
data, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used. As an
example of condition prognostics, the authors attempted to
analyze a SGTR accident. The frequency of SGTR has been
estimated by identifying the number of functional impacts
during the critical time of interest and update. For instance, in
NUREG/CR-5750 [22], three functional impact1 events had
been observed in 499 critical years. The IE frequency was
calculated using a Jeffreys noninformative prior in a Bayes
updated distribution in Equation 2. Therefore, the IE
frequency for the PWR was estimated as 7.0E-03 per critical
year.
IESGTR ¼ Nþ 1=2T ; [2]
where N is the number of functional impact events, T is the
critical years.
This frequency remains constant during the whole plant
lifetime and is regarded as a prior distribution, f0, for an IE
frequency. However, condition monitoring enables us to up-
date the IE frequency, and condition prognostics can predict
future frequency. In this section, a time-dependent PSAmodel
including the assessment of degradation of Steam Generator
(SG) tubes will be explained.
SG tubes have a relatively high possibility of damage
occurrence on account of their design, with thin thickness to1 The event category in the functional impact group includes
risk-significant events that could impact the ability to remove
decay heat.
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Fig. 5 e Nodalization for a typical passive residual heat removal system.
Table 2 e Simulation results for the passive residual heat
removal system.
Case ID Parameters Probability Success/fail
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 4e2 1 1208improve heat transfer efficiency. Actual incidents resulting
from stress corrosion cracking and wear damage have
frequently been reported in domestic and foreign papers. For
this reason, the structural and burst integrities of SG tubes in
static and transient conditions are required to be secured due
to the potential for radioactive contamination to the second-
ary system caused by the aforementioned damagemodes [23].
Damage of SG tubes is well known as an IE belonging to the
category of “Loss of coolant accidents” in PSA.
For an illustrative purpose, this study conducted a time-
dependent probabilistic assessment for the outside axial crack
using the PASTA (probabilistic algorithm for steam generator
tube assessment) program [24]. Structural integrity
assessment for SG tubes is performed via three steps. The
first step, degradation assessment, is a preliminary analysis
before performing the in-service inspection of SGs. The
second step is a condition monitoring assessment that
checks whether SGs satisfied the performance criteria
during a previous period after the first step in-service
inspection. The final step, operational assessment, assessesTable 1 e Characteristic parameters of the passive
residual heat removal system.
Parameter Nominal
value
Range Discretized value
Probability
Reactor power
(MWth)
2715 2515e2915 2515 2715 2915
0.17 0.65 0.18
IRWST
temperature (C)
40 20e60 20 40 60
0.11 0.69 0.2whether a SG will satisfy the performance criteria until the
next inspection period. When performing operational
assessment, an equation taking into account the
probabilistic theory determines the burst pressure of the
outer cracks in the axial direction. The mathematical model
to calculate the burst pressure is based on the results of the
burst test for large-scale ruptures of various sizes, derived
from engineering analyses such as regression analysis [25].
In order to reduce the uncertainty of the material property,
nondestructive measurement, and crack growth rate, the
Monte Carlo method was used. Burst pressure is determined
using the lowest 5% method.
An analysis model of a certain NPP with 400 outside axial
cracks was selected. Operation time was set to 0.5e2.5 Effec-
tive full power operation year (EFPY), the number ofPower
(MWth)
Temperature
(C)
1 2515 20 0.0187 Success
2 2515 40 0.1173 Success
3 2515 60 0.0340 Success
4 2715 20 0.0715 Success
5 2715 40 0.4485 Success
6 2715 60 0.1300 Fail
7 2915 20 0.0198 Success
8 2915 40 0.1242 Success
9 2915 60 0.0360 Fail
Fig. 6 e Reliability distribution for the passive residual heat
removal system.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 4e2 1 1 209simulations was 10,000, the outer diameter of SG tubes was
19.05 mm, and the thickness was 1.06 mm. Young modulus is
199.94 GPa and the sum of yield strength and tensile strength
is 1,035 MPa. Burst frequency is computed by multiplying the
occurrence frequency of initial cracks calculated from the
NPP, which is the same procedure as NUREG/CR-5750. In this
analysis, various sources of random errors are possible due to
measurement uncertainties such as nondestructive mea-
surement methods, crack size, crack growth rate, and mate-
rial properties of the heat transfer pipe. The burst probabilityFig. 7 e Uncertainty range in evaluating steam generator tube's
probabilistic algorithm for steam generator tube assessment.and the corresponding uncertainty band caused by these error
sources are shown in Fig. 7. The uncertainty band for crack
length is negligible due to the accuracy of the
nondestructive method whereas there are definite bands in
crack depth of ± 38 mm and material property of ± 8%.
Consequently, these errors cause differences between the
maximum and minimum values in Figs. 7A, 7C, and 7D. We
can conclude these facts should affect the IE frequency in
terms of reactor operating time, so that the representation
of time-dependent CDF considering ageing prediction is
possible.
Fig. 8 shows the burst probabilities according to EFPY by
considering all variables. As shown, the uncertainty band is
proportional to EFPY.
As the next step, the necessary statistical parameters are
calculated from prognostic results of SG tubes and the SGTR
frequency is updated using the calculated parameters. The
results in Fig. 8 correspond to the likelihood, L, for the IE of
SGTR. The statistical parameters are obtained from Equation
3. In this study, in order to simplify the calculation steps, the
prior distribution and the likelihood were regarded as
Poisson distributions.
Lðx1;x2;…;xn; q1;…; qmÞ
¼
Yn
i¼1
fðxi; q1;…; qmÞ; vlogLðx1;x2;…;xn; q1;…; qmÞ
vqj
¼ 0; (3)
where L is the likelihood function, xi is the observation data,
and qi is parameter i.lifetime. EFPY, effective full power operation year; PASTA,
Fig. 8 e Total uncertainty band for steam generator tubes.
EFPY, effective full power operation Year; PASTA,
probabilistic algorithm for steam generator tube
assessment.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 0 4e2 1 1210Fig. 9 represents the updated IE or posterior distribution, f00,
that includes the SG tube aging effect using the Bayesian
approach in Equation 4. In this example, the IE frequency
increases about 0.002 in 2.5 EFPY. This value is of use in
evaluating the variation of CDF and corresponding economic
effect along with reactor operating time.
f
00 ðqÞ ¼ kLðqÞf 0ðqÞ; k ¼
2
4 Z
∞
∞
LðqÞf 0ðqÞdq
3
5
1
; [4]
where f0 is a prior distribution for an IE frequency and f00 is a
posterior distribution for an IE frequency.4. Conclusion
Thispaperaddressedamethod toprovide time-andcondition-
dependent risk by integrating a conventional PSA model with
condition monitoring and prognostics techniques. As illustra-
tive examples, we explained (1) how the failure probability of aFig. 9 e Updating steam generator tube rupture initiating
event containing steam generator tube aging effect. EFPY,
effective full power operation year.PRHRS can be changed under different plant conditions and (2)
howtheCDF is changeddue to thecrackoccurrenceprobability
in SG tubes in terms of operating time.
Passive systems have the benefit of being driven without
external power but they cannot be controlled by operators and
have less driving force in certain operating conditions. In
order to consider these factors in calculating the CDF, condi-
tion monitoring was able to contribute to the update of failure
rate of the corresponding BEs. In other words, online moni-
toring and offline analysis for the performance of passive
systems described in the section “Enabling techniques” can be
integrated together, and the integrated model is finally able to
provide online and “real-time” risk with less uncertainty.
The IE frequency currently used in a PSAmodel is a kind of
averaged and lumped result for the entire plant lifetime. As
the inspection and prognostic techniques advance, it seems
possible to inspect the detailed and accurate degradation
status for significant systems or structure. This can update the
IE frequency and the simulation for the future risk can provide
time-dependent behavior. Particularly, prognostics are useful
to achieve the strategy for condition-based maintenance and
modernization with fewer systematic errors.Conflicts of interest
None declared.
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